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Foreword
The Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), located within the University of Cape Towns
School of Economics, was formed in 1990 to undertake economic policy-oriented research.
The aim of the units work is the achievement of more effective public policy for industrial development
in South and Southern Africa.
The DPRUs mission is to undertake internationally recognised policy research that contributes to
the quality and effectiveness of such policy.
The unit is involved in research activities in the following areas:
• Trade and Industrial policy
• Technology policy
• Labour market policy
• Industrial organisation
These policy briefs are intended to catalyse policy debate. They express the views of their
respective authors and not necessarily those of the DPRU.
They present the major research findings of the Industrial Strategy Project (ISP). The aim of the ISP
is to promote industrial development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
through regional economic integration and cooperation.  It is a three-year project that commenced
in August 1998 and is funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
Ultimately, this project will identify the policies and programmes that support regional interactions
that contribute to the industrialisation of SADC national economies.
This policy brief is a shortened version of the following DPRU Working Paper:
Macroeconomic policy and trade integration in Southern Africa
Charles Harvey
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to determine if macroeconomic policy convergence among
member countries of the Southern African Development Community1 (SADC) is required
for establishing and sustaining a free trade area (FTA). The paper also investigates whether
a restraining mechanism is required in order to compel member countries to have
compatible macroeconomic policies.
Benefits and challenges  free trade areas
The history of regional free trade areas in Sub-Saharan Africa is that most of them have
either failed, or have stayed in existence on paper with very little actual progress towards
their objectives.  In light of the limited success of regional free trade areas, why do African
countries keep trying to establish regional free trade areas? The table on the following page
highlights some of the benefits and challenges facing free trade areas.
1  In this paper, discussion of SADC does not include the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the Seychelles
Might SADC succeed where other regional trade agreements have not?
Are there any reasons for thinking that a SADC free trade area might succeed where other
such initiatives have failed?
The success of SADC depends on:
 South Africas commitment to and active involvement in the implementation of the SADC
trade protocol. South Africas GDP is about 45% of the Sub-Saharan African total, and
74% of SADCs GDP.  Clearly, the free trade area would be negligible without South
Africa.
 The joining of non-SACU members of SADC if it is to be more than a reworking of SACU.
Why would non-SACU members want to join SADC? It can be argued that the non-
SACU members of SADC cannot afford to be excluded from the South African market,
and will therefore choose to join a SADC free trade area for the following reasons:
- To avoid incurring the cost imposed by the common external tariff of SACU
- To reduce bilateral trade deficits with South Africa
- To develop non-traditional exports
 Prospects for economic convergence.  Some non-SACU manufacturing sectors in SADC
already have the potential to access and compete with the South African market, for
example Mauritius and Zimbabwe.
 New investment to develop non-traditional exports
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 The ability to reduce pressures towards disintegration. The most common reason by far
for the failure of established free trade areas is a belief, correct or not, that one country
(usually the more economically advanced) is getting a larger share of the benefits than
accrues to other members.
Logically, the less advantaged members of a free trade area should choose to maintain
it if they are better off than they would be without it, but in practice they do not if one
member is perceived to gain more than the others.  If that was the case for Kenya in the
Table 1:  Free Trade Areas: Benefits and Challenges
Benefits Challenges
Economies of scale
African countries can gain access to
somewhat larger markets than available
domestically, by creating regional trading
associations.Larger markets are more
efficient than smaller markets.
Underdeveloped transport and
communication networks. Also, much of
GDP in Africa is still generated by
subsistence activity, which generates no
monetary demand; and an above average
proportion of monetary demand is for basic
consumer goods such as food and clothing,
in which economies of scale are not
significant.
Increased competition
Increased competition increases efficiency
levels, giving countries a better chance in
the long run of being internationally
competitive. It has been argued that it is
more realistic for producers in the BLNS
countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and
Swaziland) to test their competitive ability in
the South African market initially, whereas
they would not be able to graduate to
competition in global markets without this
stepping stone being available.
Underdeveloped industrial sectors
Development of export competitiveness
Opportunity to develop non-traditional
exports, mainly manufactured goods
Low levels of investment (investment in
non-traditional industrial sectors is crucial
for countries to develop export sectors that
are competitive)
Bargaining power
Strengthening of political and economic
bargaining power -  greater voice in global
economic negotiations
Agreement on a common position
Theory of economic convergence
This theory states that when countries are in
a free trading relationship, the lower the
starting point in terms of gross national
product (GNP) per head, the faster the rate
of growth. There is evidence that the small
members of SACU have grown faster than
their neighbours.
Creation of a SADC free trade area may
not necessarily have the same effect on
economic growth on all new members, as it
had on the smaller members of SACU.
Existing manufacturing sectors could be
driven out of business if they are unable to
compete with imports from South Africa.
Acceptance of the free trade area may
disappear and lead to withdrawal before
long term benefits can accrue.
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East African Community, the expectation of it happening in a SADC free trade area
must be several times stronger, because the economy of South Africa is not only totally
dominant in size (roughly 75% of total SADC GDP), but is even more dominant in
manufacturing capacity (nearly 85% of manufacturing capacity in SADC) and level of
technical development.  To make matters worse, South Africa already has large bilateral
trade surpluses with other SADC members.
 Another possible reason for arguing that the dominance of South Africa in the Southern
African economy might make a SADC free trade area an exception, to the record of
failure of regional trading associations, is that the one successful example is SACU, which
has existed for nearly 90 years.  South Africa is of course even more dominant in SACU
than it would be in a SADC free trade area.
Therefore, examining the reasons why SACU has survived might throw some light on the
prospects for SADC. In particular, in the context of this paper, the relevance or not of
macroeconomic policy convergence to the survival of SACU will be examined.
Success of SACU; prospects for SADC
Evidence suggests that the four smaller members of SACU have gained from membership,
as suggested by the convergence of income per head.
Evidence of compatible macroeconomic policies in SACU
SACU has displayed evidence of macroeconomic policy convergence throughout its
history:
 Common currency
 Similar inflation rates
 Narrow fluctuating real bilateral exchange rates
Undoubtedly, the benefits within SACU were not hindered by the convergence of
macroeconomic policy.  What cannot be said is whether similar inflation rates and other
evidence of macroeconomic policy convergence were necessary for BLNS to derive
benefits from SACU.
The experience of SACU, therefore, does not help in deciding whether macroeconomic
policy convergence is necessary for the success of a free trade area.
Will establishing a SADC free trade area require macroeconomic policy
convergence?
There are strong arguments that a common currency area requires macroeconomic policy
convergence.  These arguments were accepted, for example, by the European Union in
introducing the Euro.  It does not seem to be necessary, however, for similar conditions to
apply to the establishment of a free trade area.  Again, the experience of the European
Union supports this proposition, in that it was created, and proved sustainable, without
macroeconomic policy convergence, and indeed with some quite weak currencies
operating alongside very strong ones.
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It may therefore be something of a coincidence that four out of the five countries in SACU
are members of a common currency area; it did not do any harm, but it is difficult to argue
that it was a necessary condition for the sustainability of SACU. On the basis of the analysis
to this point, a SADC free trade area may well be established.
Will a SADC free trade area survive without macroeconomic policy
convergence?
However, a SADC free trade area will not have much chance of surviving, because a
significant number of the non-SACU members of SADC do not have the capacity at
present to increase their exports to South Africa.
They would need, therefore, to attract the investment in new capacity that would make
such export growth possible, and this would require convergent macroeconomic policy
together with other necessary conditions.
It will be sufficient for the non-SACU members of SADC to attain inflation rates equal to or
less than that of South Africa (and the rest of SACU).  The actual inflation rate is probably
less important than maintaining a low and stable rate over an extended period, or in some
other way creating the expectation in the minds of investors that it will be stable.
What is the current degree of macroeconomic convergence in SADC?
Improved prospects for the survival of a SADC free trade area
A number of the non-SACU members have embarked on structural adjustment
programmes.  This has involved liberalisation of the trade account, and movement towards
more realistic real exchange rates.  However, not all non-SACU exchange rates are now
market-determined, and there has been greatly varying progress in the reduction of rates of
inflation, with some reversals.
but evidence of macroeconomic imbalance:
Inflation
Inflation has not followed a constant trend in SADC countries, for example,  Mozambiques
inflation was between 40% and 50% between 1980 and 1986, but was reduced to 5.5% in
1997, and prices actually fell (by 1.3%) in 1998.  This achievement does not necessarily
give Mozambiques macroeconomic policy considerable credibility, because there is
always the possibility of policy being relaxed and inflation rising to previous levels.
From an investors point of view, these unstable inflation rates can be perceived as
evidence of macroeconomic imbalance.
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Budget deficits
Although SADC countries have at times suffered from imported inflation, the most
common cause has been budget deficits financed by central banks.
There is considerable exchange rate volatility  bilateral real exchange rates against the
rand of the non-SACU members of SADC have displayed large short term fluctuations. The
tendency of exchange rates to eventually return to some sort of equilibrium, if it still exists,
is insufficient to establish favourable investment conditions [Harvey & Hudson, 1993].
Grants in the form of foreign exchange make it possible to increase supply by paying for
more imports.  However, heavy dependence on grants to reduce budget deficits may not
be sustainable.
Aid and aid conditionality
The credibility of macroeconomic stability in those SADC members heavily dependent on
aid, depends on how likely it is that current levels of donor support will be sustained.  That
depends, in turn, on recipient countries adhering strictly to both economic and political
conditions.
The conditions may have been introduced for good reasons, but from the point of view of
creating a favourable investment climate it increases the ways in which IMF/World Bank
agreements can break down.  In turn, this has made investment more risky, and frequently
Inflation in SADC countries, 1980-98
1980-89 1990-95 1996 1997 1998
South Africa 14.6 11.8 7.4 8.5 7.0
  Other SACU
Botswana 10.8 12.5 9.8 8.6 6.7
Lesotho 13.8 12.9 9.3 8.5 7.8
Namibia 13.0 11.8 8.0 8.8 6.2
Swaziland 14.2 12.7 12.5 9.7 7.5
  Non-SACU SADC
Angola - 870.3 905.3 111.2 91.1
Malawi 16.8 30.8 37.6 9.1 29.7
Mauritius 11.2 8.2 6.6 6.8 4.7
Mozambique 45.1 47.5 45.0 5.5 - 1.3
Tanzania 30.1 28.9 19.7 16.1 12.8
Zambia 38.4 117.7 46.3 24.8 31.6
Zimbabwe 12.8 25.9 21.4 18.7 31.8
Notes:
(1)  Figures for 1980-89 and 1990-5 from CREFSA, 1998, which used IFS, World Bank, EIU and central bank
annual reports. (2)  Figures for later years from IFS, except those in square brackets which are from other
sources, mostly EIU Country Reports, and may not therefore be comparable.
so risky that little or no foreign investment has taken place. Loan default - Both Zambia and
Zimbabwe have had IMF and World Bank support withdrawn for failing to meet this short
term conditionality (that is the repayment of loans frequent intervals).
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 South Africa can serve as a potential export market and a potential source of
manufacturing investment
 South African firms are far more likely to invest in such countries as Malawi and
Zambia than non-regional investors (Some South African investment has taken
place in recent years, notably in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, but relatively
little of this investment is directed at exporting to South Africa.
This potential contribution will be of little use if the SADC free trade area is abandoned
quickly by those countries which perceive either that they have gained little, or that most of
the gains have gone to South Africa.
The problem then is to find some way of making a SADC free trade area reasonably
attractive to all its members in the short term, in order to give longer term benefits a chance
of being achieved.
A way must be found quickly to generate new investment capable of exporting to South
Africa (and to a much lesser extent to the rest of SADC).  It cannot wait for individual
countries to sustain sound policies for long enough to establish their individual credibility.
Those individuals SADC countries with a past history of instability would need many years
of macroeconomic stability to achieve the credibility necessary for investment, acting on
their own.
Relevance of macroeconomic convergence to sustaining a SADC FTA
Despite, the unfavourable investment conditions in many of the SADC economies, a SADC
free trade area may succeed because of the opportunity for growth and recovery.
The currently very rundown economies in SADC need every possible opportunity to help
them to recover, and grow past the levels (of income per head, delivery of public services,
and quality of infrastructure) that they reached 10 or 20 years ago.  One of those
opportunities would be the opening up of the South African market because:
External indebtedness
The highly indebted economies will find it difficult to take advantage of a new trading
arrangement due to the overhang of external debt.
 Present value of external debt as a percentage of GDP, 1996
SACU Non-SACU SADC
South Africa 18  Angola 310
 Other SACU Malawi    76
Botswana   [14] Mauritius    45
Lesotho 33  Mozambique 411
Namibia [11]  Tanzania 114
Swaziland [19]  Zambia 161
Zimbabwe    67
Sources: World Bank World Development Report 1998/99: 230-1; figures in  square brackets are external
debt as a percentage of GNP from World Bank Global Development Finance 1999.
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• The South African government has also raised the limits under exchange control
rules of outward investment by South African companies in SADC.
Nevertheless, it is difficult for the South African government, donors or domestic
governments to induce private sector investment in the SADC periphery if other
conditions are fundamentally unfavourable, or if favourable conditions are seen
to be unstable and therefore lack credibility.
The most effective government action, whether by individual governments or by a
regional institution, would be to speed up the process by which sound macroeconomic
policy (supposing that it has been established) acquires medium and long term
credibility.
What can governments do?
Governments should not
• invest themselves directly in export-oriented manufacturing because African
economic history makes it unlikely that government investments in manufacturing
will be anything but a disaster.
• direct investment to areas where it would not willingly go, whether within a single
country, as for example border firms in South Africa, or within a regional trading
area, as history shows that it does not work.  The firms themselves struggle to
make a profit without any subsidy, and multiplier effects do not emerge.
Some action is possible
• investment in infrastructure
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Conclusion
SADC governments must create a regional agency of restraint, by voluntary negotiated
agreement, with credible sanctions against breaking its rules. The most obvious sanction
would be loss of membership.  Of itself, this might not be very threatening.  However, if it
meant exclusion from the South African market and South African investment, then it might
be effective.
In other words, SADC as a free trade area would have to develop a mechanism for
constraining macroeconomic extravagance, not necessarily in order to establish a free trade
area, but in order for it to have a chance of being sustained.
It would be absolutely essential that a SADC agency of restraint, and its sanctions, be
negotiated and accepted through conviction by the SADC member governments.  Forcing
governments into such an arrangement, whether using the muscle of the IMF or the
regional dominance of South Africa, would not work
This is essential for the non-SACU members to have a chance of attracting the investment
that would enable them to take advantage of intra-SADC trade.  Otherwise, a SADC free
trade area will swiftly collapse.
Macroeconomic policy convergence may not be strictly necessary for countries within a
regional trading arrangement to trade with each other using their existing economic
capacity.  The argument of this paper is that macro convergence around low rates inflation,
with stable real exchange rates, is necessary where member countries do not have the
economic capacity to take immediate advantage of new trading opportunities.
The potential benefits of a regional free trade area can only be secured if a credible
collective agency of restraint is established by the SADC governments themselves.
Other mechanisms might be able to contribute.  For example, some form of partial
investment guarantee to reduce the risks of South African investment in the SADC




This paper finds that macroeconomic policy
convergence is not necessary for establishing a
free trade area (FTA), but is necessary for
sustaining an FTA in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC).
The paper also finds that a credible collective
agency of restraint against macroeconomic
divergence must be created by SADC
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